BOOK: Sara Veronica PARINI, Loving the poor, saving the rich. Behavioural aspects and economic development of Jonh Law's bank runs (Torino: Giappichelli, 2020). ISBN: 9788892129962, pp. 144, € 16,00

 

(Source: Giappichelli)

ABOUT THE BOOK

The long series of studies of John Law's monetary theory and practice point to two almost constant interpretations of the Controller General of the Duke of Orleans' finances. The first sees Law as an unscrupulous banker, a wizard of lies; the second, on the contrary, appreciates his efforts to create a new monetary system that would generate full employment in an economically compromised France. However, Law's creation of new credit institutions — different from the banks of the time — and the reasons for the unfortunate end to his social and economic life, have aroused little interest. This work thus offers an in-depth analysis of the theories expressed in his most important work, Money and Trade, by examining the Bank of Turin experience and the reasons Law’s work failed in France due to the acquisition of national public debt.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Sara Veronica Parini è professore associato di Storia del diritto medievale e moderno e di Storia delle codificazioni moderne (IUS/19), presso l’Università degli Studi di Milano

The table of contents is available here.

More information with the publisher.

BOOK: Emilio ALBERTARIO, Les usuræ en droit romain: un manuscrit inédit. Traduction et présentation de Laurent Hecketsweiler, texte établi par Franco Vallocchia (Paris: Mare & Martin, 2019). ISBN : 978-2-84934-409-5, pp. 180, € 18

 

(Source: Mare & Martin)

ABOUT THE BOOK

Récemment sortie d’archives familiales (et d’un carton), cette étude de jeunesse d’Emilio Albertario (1885-1948) traite de l’intérêt de l’argent en droit romain (usura pecuniae). Écrit au tout début du xxe siècle, publié pour la première fois en 2016 et désormais mis à la disposition d’un public français, ce texte est une brillante et solide mise au point sur un sujet resté très actuel. Actuel et indémodable, tant la question des usurae fut travaillée et discutée pendant des siècles! Avantageusement, le manuscrit de 1907 interroge les juristes, toutes époques confondues, sur cette question des usurae, à mi-chemin entre le droit et l’économie. Qu’il s’agisse des juristes romains, de leurs successeurs byzantins, et plus tard des juristes français ou allemands... Autant de lectures, de strates interprétatives, qui permettent de saisir l’ingénierie – évolutive dans l’histoire – du commerce de l’argent.

ABOUT THE EDITORS

Laurent Hecketsweiler est maître de conférences à la faculté de droit de Montpellier.

Franco Vallocchia est professeur de droit romain à l’université de Rome La Sapienza.

More information with the publisher.

BOOK: Marju LUTS-SOOTAK and Frank L. SCHÄFER, eds., Recht und Wirtschaft in Stadt und Land (Bern: Peter Lang, 2020). ISBN 978-3-631-81058-3, EUR 84.10

 

(Source: Peter Lang)

Peter Lang is publishing an edited collection on the legal history of the Nordic Sea region.

ABOUT THE BOOK

Der Sammelband dokumentiert ausgewählte Vorträge des Neunten Rechtshistorikertages im Ostseeraum vom Mai 2018 in Estland. Die Beiträge decken unter dem Generalthema «Recht und Wirtschaft in Stadt und Land» die gesamte Spannbreite der Rechtsgeschichte des Ostseeraumes sowie der Forschungsinteressen der Rechtshistorikerinnen und Rechtshistoriker der Anrainerstaaten ab.

ABOUT THE EDITORS

Marju Luts-Sootak ist Professorin für Rechtsgeschichte an der Rechtsfakultät der Universität Tartu, Estland.

Frank L. Schäfer ist Direktor der Germanistischen Abteilung des Instituts für Rechtsgeschichte und geschichtliche Rechtsvergleichung an der Universität Freiburg, Deutschland.

Marju Luts-Sootak is Professor of Legal History at the School of Law, University of Tartu in Estonia.

Frank L. Schäfer is Director of the Section for German Legal History at the Institute for Legal History and Comparative Legal History at Freiburg University in Germany.

 

The table of contents can be found here

BOOK: Giuseppi DARI-MATTIACCI and Dennis P. KEHOE, eds., Roman Law and Economics, 2 Vol. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020). ISBN 9780198787211, £95.00

(Source: OUP)

Oxford University Press is publishing a new, 2-volume work on Roman Law and Economics.

ABOUT THE BOOK

Ancient Rome is the only society in the history of the western world whose legal profession evolved autonomously, distinct and separate from institutions of political and religious power. Roman legal thought has left behind an enduring legacy and exerted enormous influence on the shaping of modern legal frameworks and systems, but its own genesis and context pose their own explanatory problems. The economic analysis of Roman law has enormous untapped potential in this regard: by exploring the intersecting perspectives of legal history, economic history, and the economic analysis of law, the two volumes of Roman Law and Economics are able to offer a uniquely interdisciplinary examination of the origins of Roman legal institutions, their functions, and their evolution over a period of more than 1000 years, in response to changes in the underlying economic activities that those institutions regulated.

Volume II covers the concepts of exchange, ownership, and disputes, analysing the detailed workings of credit, property, and slavery, among others, while Volume I explores Roman legal institutions and organizations in detail, from the constitution of the Republic to the management of business in the Empire. Throughout each volume, contributions from specialists in legal and economic history, law, and legal theory are underpinned by rigorous analysis drawing on modern empirical and theoretical techniques and methodologies borrowed from economics. In demonstrating how these can be fruitfully applied to the study of ancient societies, with due deference to the historical context, Roman Law and Economics opens up a host of new avenues of research for scholars and students in each of these fields and in the social sciences more broadly, offering new ways in which different modes of enquiry can connect with and inform each other.

ABOUT THE EDITORS

Edited by Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Alfred W. Bressler Professor of Law, Columbia Law School, USA, and Dennis P. Kehoe, Andrew W. Mellon Professor in the Humanities (Classical Studies), Tulane University, USA

Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci is an Alfred W. Bressler Professor of Law at Columbia Law School. His research currently focuses on the theory and historical emergence of business organizations, the network structure of codes and constitutions, the economics of shareholder lawsuits, standard form and relational contracts, and carrots versus sticks.

Dennis P. Kehoe is the Andrew W. Mellon Professor in the Humanities (Classical Studies) at Tulane University. His research interests centre on Roman social and economic history and Roman law, with his current work focusing on the role of legal institutions in shaping the economy of the Roman Empire.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

VOLUME I

Frontmatter
List of Figures
List of Tables
List of Contributors
1: Rome and the Economics of Ancient Law I, Geoffrey Parsons Miller
I. Institutions
2: What Can the Endogenous Institutions Literature Tell Us About Ancient Rome?, Robert K. Fleck, F. Andrew Hanssen, and Dennis P. Kehoe
3: The Constitution of the Roman Republic, Eric A. Posner
4: Law-Making and Economic Change during the Republic and Early Empire, Luuk de Ligt
II. Markets and Trade
5: Setting the Rules of the Game: The Market and its Working in the Roman Empire, Elio Lo Cascio
6: Statistics in Ancient History: Prices and Trade in the Pax Romana, Peter Temin
7: The Organization of India-to-Rome Trade: Loans and Agents in the Muziris Papyrus, Ron Harris
III. Organizing Business
8: Incomplete Organizations: Legal Entities and Asset Partitioning in Roman Commerce, Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, and Richard Squire
9: Roman Business Associations, Andreas Martin Fleckner
10: Agency Problems and Organizational Costs in Slave-Run Businesses, Barbara Abatino and Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci
11: Mandate and the Management of Business in the Roman Empire, Dennis P. Kehoe
Endmatter
Index

VOLUME II

Frontmatter
List of Figures
List of Tables
List of Contributors
12: Rome and the Economics of Ancient Law II, Geoffrey Parsons Miller
IV. Slavery and the Roman Economy
13: Law, Slaves, and Markets in the Roman Imperial System, Aldo Schiavone
14: The Practice of Manumission through Negotiated Conditions in Imperial Rome, Egbert Koops
V. Credit
15: Banking, Money-Lending, and Elite Financial Life in Rome, Jean Andreau
16: Secured Transactions in Classical Roman Law, Hendrik L. E. Verhagen
VI. Property
17: Ancient Rome: Legal Foundations of the Growth of an Indispensable City, Robert C. Ellickson
18: Land Demarcation in Ancient Rome, Gary D. Libecap and Dean Lueck
19: The Institutions of Roman Markets, Benito Arruñada
VII. Dispute Resolution and Remedies
20: One Step at a Time in Roman Law: How Roman Pleading Rules Shape the Substantive Structure of Private Law, Richard A. Epstein
21: Private Prosecution and Enforcement in Roman Law, David Friedman
22: Deterrence of Wrongdoing in Ancient Law, Francesco Parisi, Daniel Pi, Barbara Luppi, and Iole Fargnoli
23: Collective Responsibility, Thomas J. Miceli
24: The Dual Origin of the Duty to Disclose in Roman Law, Barbara Abatino and Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci
Endmatter
Index

More info here

BOOK PRESENTATION : Wim DECOCK, Le marché du mérite, (Université de Lille, 13 March 2020).

(Source : Zones-sensibles)

BOOK PRESENTATION : is on 13 March 2020, 10:30. At the Law faculty, Université de Lille. Luisa BRUNORI (HDR CNRS, U.Lille) and Alexis AUDEMAR (Phd candidate, U.Lille) will introduce the author.

Wim DECOCK will present his book Le marché du mérite, Penser le droit et l’économie avec Léonard Lessius.  Published by : Zones sensibles, 248p. ISBN 978 293 0601 40 0. 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR : Wim DECOCK is a legal history Professor in KU Leuwen and the University of Liege. He also intervenes in various European universities and institutions. 

ABOUT THE BOOK : It aims to understand the origin of modern economy by its theological foundations. More information can be found here : http://www.zones-sensibles.org/wim-decock-le-marche-du-merite/

CONTENTS :

• 1. L’« Oracle des Pays-Bas »
• 2. L’ombre de Max Weber
• 3. Pactum serva
• 4. Usure et marché
• 5. Information et spéculation
• 6. Risques, assurances et subprimes
• 7. Monopoles et industrie
• 8. Le salut de l’économie
• 9. L’économie du salut
• 10. Occupation et ascétisme

BOOK: George PRIEST, The Rise of Law and Economics - An Intellectual History (London: Routledge, 2019). ISBN 9780367339388, £39.99

(Source: Routledge)

Routledge is publishing a new intellectual history of law and economics.

ABOUT THE BOOK

This is a history - though, intentionally, a brief history - of the rise of law and economics as a field of thought in the US college and law school academy, though the field has expanded to Europe and South America and will expand further as other legal systems develop.

This book explains the origins of the field and the sources of its growth during its formative period. It describes the intellectual roots of the field, and the field’s relationship to the understanding of the role of the legal system in directing the functioning of the economy. It describes the effect of the Great Depression and the expansion of governmental power on advancing the functional approach. The book then addresses the work of Aaron Director, during the late 1950s, on focusing economic analysis as a means of understanding the effects of the legal and regulatory system on the allocation of resources in the society. Then it turns to the subsequent intellectual founders of the field—Ronald Coase, Guido Calabresi and Richard Posner—and attempts to explain the significance of their work. It also discusses the efforts of Robert Bork and Henry Manne toward the influence of law and economics on public policy. The book ends with the founding of the American Law & Economics Association in 1991.

This is an essential companion of law and economics texts for undergraduate law and economic students and, especially, as a general supplement to first year casebooks for law school students.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

George L. Priest is the Edward J. Phelps Professor of Law and Economics at Yale Law School.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction 2. The Early Development of the Functional Approach to Law 3. The Problems of the Depression and the Broader Acceptance of the Functional Approach to Law 4. The Birth of Modern Law and Economics as a Discipline 5. The Revolutionary Expansion of Law and Economics: Ronald H. Coase 6. Calabresi and the Economic Framework of The Costs of Accidents 7. Law and Economics Made Dominant: Richard A. Posner and Economic Analysis of Law 8. Coase, Calabresi, and Posner Compared 9. The Influence of Law and Economics on Regulation and Antitrust Law 10. Henry Manne and the Popular Expansion of Law and Economics 11. Epilogue: The John M. Olin Foundation and the Founding of the American Law & Economics Association

More information here

BOOK: Henry N. BUTLER and Jonathan KLICK, eds., History of Law and Economics [Economic Approaches to Law Series] (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018). ISBN 9781786432988, £247.50

(Source: Edward Elgar Publishing)

Edward Elgar Publishing has just published an essay collection dealing with the history of the law and economics movement.

ABOUT THE BOOK

Dedicated to the late Henry G. Manne, this authoritative collection surveys the development of law and economics both as a scholarly field and as an educational program. Starting as a niche area, centered primarily at the University of Chicago, law and economics has grown to be the dominant field in US legal scholarship. The influential articles presented in this volume trace that development from the mid-20th century through to today, focusing on both the personalities who laid the groundwork for the field’s success and the intellectual debates that fueled its growth. Together with an original introduction by the editors, this collection is a valuable research tool for academics and students interested in the history of law and economics.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents:

Introduction Henry N. Butler and Jonathan Klick

PART I THE RISE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
1. George L. Priest (2005), ‘The Rise of Law and Economics: A Memoir of the Early Years’, in Francesco Parisi and Charles K. Rowley (eds), The Origins of Law and Economics: Essays by the Founding Fathers, Chapter 14, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 350–82

2. Edmund W. Kitch (1983), ‘The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Economics at Chicago, 1932–1970’, Journal of Law and Economics, XXVI (1), April, 163–234

3. Louis De Alessi (1999), ‘The John M. Olin Fellowship Program in Law and Economics’, Case Western Reserve Law Review, 50 (2), Winter, 341–6

4. Henry N. Butler (1999), ‘The Manne Programs in Economics for Federal Judges’, Case Western Reserve Law Review, 50 (2), Winter, 351–71, 376–87

5. Henry G. Manne (2005), ‘How Law and Economics was Marketed in a Hostile World: A Very Personal History’, in Francesco Parisi and Charles K. Rowley (eds), The Origins of Law and Economics: Essays by the Founding Fathers, Chapter 12, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 309–27

6. Steven G. Medema (2015), ‘From Dismal to Dominance? Law and Economics and the Values of Imperial Science, Historically Contemplated’, in Aristides N. Hatzis and Nicholas Mercuro (eds), Law and Economics: Philosophical Issues and Fundamental Questions, Chapter 5, Abingdon, UK and New York, NY, USA: Routledge, 69–88

PART II PIONEERS AND FOUNDING FATHERS
7. Sam Peltzman (2009), ‘Aaron Director’s Influence on Antitrust Policy’, in Lloyd R. Cohen and Joshua D. Wright (eds), Pioneers of Law and Economics, Chapter 3, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 35–49

8. Steven G. Medema (2016), ‘Ronald Coase and the Legal–Economic Nexus’, in Claude Ménard and Elodie Bertrand (eds), The Elgar Companion to Ronald H. Coase, Part V, Chapter 21, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 291–304

9. Harold Demsetz (2009), ‘George J. Stigler and his Contributions to Law and Economics’, in Lloyd R. Cohen and Joshua D. Wright (eds), Pioneers of Law and Economics, Chapter 4, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 50–59

10. Richard A. Posner (1993), ‘Gary Becker’s Contributions to Law and Economics’, Journal of Legal Studies, XXII (2), June, 211–5

11. Larry E. Ribstein (2009), ‘Henry Manne: Intellectual Entrepreneur’, in Lloyd R. Cohen and Joshua D. Wright (eds), Pioneers of Law and Economics, Chapter 9, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 125–44

12. Robert D. Tollison (2009), ‘Buchanan and Tullock on Law and Economics’, in Lloyd R. Cohen and Joshua D. Wright (eds), Pioneers of Law and Economics, Chapter 8, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 115–24

13. Keith N. Hylton (2009), ‘Calabresi’s Influence on Law and Economics’, in Lloyd R. Cohen and Joshua D. Wright (eds), Pioneers of Law and Economics, Chapter 13, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 224–45

14. Thomas S. Ulen (2009), ‘Pioneers of Law and Economics: William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner’, in Lloyd R. Cohen and Joshua D. Wright (eds), Pioneers of Law and Economics, Chapter 11, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 175–202

15. Nuno Garoupa and Fernando Gómez-Pomar (2009), ‘The Path Breaking Contributions of A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell to Law and Economics’, in Lloyd R. Cohen and Joshua D. Wright (eds), Pioneers of Law and Economics, Chapter 15, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 267–94

PART III AN ASSESSMENT – FROM WITHIN
16. James M. Buchanan (1974), ‘Good Economics – Bad Law’, Virginia Law Review, 60 (3), March, 483–92

17. Ronald H. Coase (1978), ‘Economics and Contiguous Disciplines’, Journal of Legal Studies, 7 (2), June, 201–11

18. Guido Calabresi (1980), ‘An Exchange – About Law and Economics: A Letter to Ronald Dworkin’, Hofstra Law Review, 8 (3), Spring, 553–62

19. Gary S. Becker (1993), ‘Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior’, Journal of Political Economy, 101 (3), June, 385–409

20. Richard A. Posner (1987), ‘The Law and Economics Movement’, American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 77 (2), May, 1–13

21. Francesco Parisi and Jonathan Klick (2004), ‘Functional Law and Economics: The Search for Value-Neutral Principles of Lawmaking’, Chicago-Kent Law Review, Symposium: Law and Economics and Legal Scholarship, 79 (2), June, 431–50

22. Robert D. Cooter (2005), ‘The Confluence of Justice and Efficiency in the Economic Analysis of Law’, in Francesco Parisi and Charles K. Rowley (eds), The Origins of Law and Economics: Essays by the Founding Fathers, Chapter 8, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 222–40

23. William M. Landes (2003), ‘The Empirical Side of Law and Economics’, University of Chicago Law Review: Centennial Tribute Essays, 70 (1), Winter, 167–80

PART IV THE CURRENT BATTLE
24. Colin Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, George Loewenstein, Ted O’Donoghue and Matthew Rabin (2003), ‘Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism”’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 151 (3), January, 1211–54

25. Christine Jolls and Cass R. Sunstein (2006), ‘Debiasing through Law’, Journal of Legal Studies, 35 (1), January, 199–241

26. Jonathan Klick and Gregory Mitchell (2006), ‘Government Regulation of Irrationality: Moral and Cognitive Hazards’, Minnesota Law Review, 90 (6), 1620–63

27. Edward L. Glaeser (2006), ‘Paternalism and Psychology’, University of Chicago Law Review, Symposium: Homo Economicus, Homo Myopicus, and the Law and Economics of Consumer Choice, 73 (1), Winter, 133–56

28. Jonathan Klick (2005), ‘The Microfoundations of Standard Form Contracts: Price Discrimination vs. Behavioral Bias’, Florida State University Law Review, 32 (2), Winter, 555–69

29. Russell Korobkin (2005), ‘Possibility and Plausibility in Law and Economics’, Florida State University Law Review, 32 (2), Winter, 781–95

30. Joshua D. Wright (2007), ‘Behavioral Law and Economics, Paternalism, and Consumer Contracts: An Empirical Perspective’, NYU Journal of Law and Liberty, 2 (3), 470–511

31. Alan Schwartz (2008), ‘How Much Irrationality Does the Market Permit?’, Journal of Legal Studies, 37 (1), January, 131–59

PART V LOOKING FORWARD
32. Douglas G. Baird (1997), ‘The Future of Law and Economics: Looking Forward’, University of Chicago Law Review, 64 (4), Fall, 1129–65

33. Richard A. Posner (1997), ‘The Future of the Law and Economics Movement in Europe’, International Review of Law and Economics: Annual EALE Conference, Bern, 6-9 September 1995, 17 (1), March, 3–14

34. Henry G. Manne and Joshua D. Wright (2008), ‘The Future of Law and Economics: A Discussion’, George Mason University Law and Economics Research Paper No. 08-35, June, 1–27

35. Jonathan Klick (2011), ‘The Empirical Revolution in Law and Economics: Inaugural Lecture for Erasmus Chair in Empirical Legal Studies’, Erasmus Law Lectures 25, The Hague, the Netherlands: Eleven International Publishing, 7–9, 11–29, 31–34

36. Joni Hersch and W. Kip Viscusi (2012), ’Law and Economics as a Pillar of Legal Education’, Review of Law and Economics, Session Paper: The Past, Present, and Future of Interdisciplinary Legal Education, 2011 Annual Meeting, American Association of Law Schools, 8 (2), October, 487–510

Index

More information here

NOTICE: "Histoire de l'Economie sans Travail. Finances, Investissement, Spéculation de l'Antiquité à nos Jours" Cycle de colloques (Paris, December 2015/June 2017)

WHAT Histoire de l'Economie sans Travail.Finances, Investissement, Spéculation de l'Antiquité à nos Jours, cycle de colloques

WHEN December 2015/June 2017

WHERE Centre aquitain d'Histoire du Droit, Université de Bordeaux, Centre d’Histoire Judiciaire, Université Lille 2, Institut d'Histoire du Droit, Université Paris 2-Panthéon-Assas

Comité scientifique

• Luisa Brunori, Centre d’Histoire Judiciaire-Université Lille 2
• Serge Dauchy, Centre d’Histoire Judiciaire-Université Lille 2
• Olivier Descamps, Université Panthéon-Assas
• Xavier Prévost, Université de Bordeaux 

1. - Les sources intellectuelles - Université Paris 2, 2 décembre 2015

La difficile conjoncture des premières années du troisième millénaire semble demander un regard de grande ampleur sur les dynamiques qui ont conduit à des phénomènes - la crise de 2008, la crise des subprimesou les bulles spéculatives – qui restent encore largement à décrypter.

   Au-delà des approches dictées par l’urgence, les aspects constitutifs des systèmes économico-juridiques contemporains, de moins en moins référés au travail humain et de plus en plus orientés vers la rémunération d’activités spéculatives, demandent désormais de faire l’objet d’une réflexion approfondie vouée à recentrer les questions et les enjeux.

L’« économie sans travail », à savoir la masse d’opérations financières rémunératrices ni du travail humain ni d’un échange de biens, a aujourd’hui un impact extraordinaire sur l’agencement socio-économique contemporain. Elle peut aller jusqu’à le mettre en danger tout en questionnant de nombreux principes fondateurs de la justice substantielle ou « distributive » qu’on considère à la base de nos systèmes institutionnels.

   Les outils juridiques de cette « économie sans travail » sont effectivement voués à la rémunération d’un quid ontologiquement très différent des prestations qui font l’objet des relations synallagmatiques classiques (le travail, l’échange de biens). Il s’agit, selon les cas, de rémunérer la capacité de prévision (dans les contrats, par exemple, defutures, de warrants, d’option), le transfert du risque (dans les dérivés de crédit, les assurances), ou la mise à disposition du capital (participations de capital en sociétés, marché actionnaire, etc.).

   Cela conduit nécessairement à s’interroger sur la justification de cette rémunération ; justification à laquelle on ne peut pas renoncer, non seulement dans les relations entre les particuliers mais dans tous les aspects du droit de l’économie.

   Le regard historique paraît nécessaire pour la compréhension de ces phénomènes, d’autant plus que ces questionnements se posent de longue date aux acteurs institutionnels. Mais la réflexion historique ne peut être qu’interdisciplinaire, compte tenu des superpositions réciproques et complexes de problématiques juridiques, économiques et philosophiques impliquées dans ce thème.

BOOK: Daniel KLERMAN (ed.), The Economics of Legal History [Economic Approaches to Law] (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2015), 808 p. ISBN 9781783471683. USD 359,96

(image source: Edward Elgar)

Edward Elgar announced the publication of Economics Of Legal History, edited by Daniel Klerman (University of South Carolina). The volume collects a series of articles on law and economics and legal history.

Table of Contents:

Acknowledgements

Introduction Daniel Klerman

PART I LAW AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE: EFFICIENCY AND BEYOND

1. Harold Demsetz (1967), ‘Toward a Theory of Property Rights’, American Economic Review, 57 (2), May, 347–59

2. Zeynep K. Hansen and Gary D. Libecap (2004), ‘The Allocation of Property Rights to Land: US Land Policy and Farm Failure in the Northern Great Plains’, Explorations in Economic History, 41 (2), April, 103–29

3. Paul G. Mahoney (2001), ‘The Political Economy of the Securities Act of 1933’, Journal of Legal Studies, XXX (1), January, 1–31

4. Daniel Klerman (2007), ‘Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law’, University of Chicago Law Review, 74 (4), Fall, 1179–226

PART II LAW AS INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: WOMEN’S AND MINORITY RIGHTS
5. James J. Heckman and Brook S. Payner (1989), ‘Determining the Impact of Federal Antidiscrimination Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks: A Study of South Carolina’, American Economic Review, 79 (1), March, 138–77

6. John R. Lott, Jr. and Lawrence W. Kenny (1999), ‘Did Women’s Suffrage Change the Size and Scope of Government?’, Journal of Political Economy, 107 (6, part 1), December, 1163–98

7. Grant Miller (2008), ‘Women’s Suffrage, Political Responsiveness, and Child Survival in American History’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123 (3), August, 1287–327


PART III LAW AS INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION
8. Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast (1989), ‘Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England’, Journal of Economic History, XLIX (4), December, 803–32

9. Nathan Sussman and Yishay Yafeh (2006), ‘Institutional Reforms, Financial Development and Sovereign Debt: Britain 1690–1790’, Journal of Economic History, 66 (4), December, 906–35

10. Daniel M. Klerman and Paul G. Mahoney (2005), ‘The Value of Judicial Independence: Evidence from Eighteenth Century England’, American Law and Economics Review, 7 (1), Spring, 1–27

11. Dan Bogart (2011), ‘Did the Glorious Revolution Contribute to the Transport Revolution? Evidence from Investment in Roads and Rivers’, Economic History Review, 64 (4), November, 1073–112


PART IV BIDIRECTIONAL HISTORIES: THE RECIPROCAL INTERACTIONS OF LAW AND SOCIETY
12. Avner Greif and David D. Laitin (2004), ‘A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change’, American Political Science Review, 98 (4), November, 633–52

13. Avner Greif (2006), ‘History Lessons: The Birth of Impersonal Exchange: The Community Responsibility System and Impartial Justice’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20 (2), Spring, 221–36

14. Claire Priest (2006), ‘Creating an American Property Law: Alienability and its Limits in American History’, Harvard Law Review, 120 (2), December, 385–458


PART V PRIVATE ORDERING
15. Robert. C. Ellickson (1989), ‘A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the Whaling Industry’, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 5 (1), Spring, 83–97

16. Karen Clay and Gavin Wright (2005), ‘Order Without Law? Property Rights During the California Gold Rush’, Explorations in Economic History, 42 (2), April, 155–83

17. Avner Greif (1989), ‘Reputations and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders’, Journal of Economic History, 49 (4), December, 857–82


PART VI LITIGATION AND CONTRACTING
18. Claire Priest (2001), ‘Currency Policies and Legal Development in Colonial New England’, Yale Law Journal, 110 (8), June, 1303–405

19. Daniel Klerman (2012), ‘The Selection of 13th-Century Disputes for Litigation’, Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 9 (2), June, 320–46

20. J. Mark Ramseyer (1995), ‘The Market for Children: Evidence from Early Modern Japan’, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 11 (1), April, 127–49


PART VII CRITIQUE OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LEGAL HISTORY
21. Robert W. Gordon (1984), ‘Critical Legal Histories’, Stanford Law Review, 36 (1-2), January, 57–125

Index

BOOK: "Making money. Coin, currency and the coming of Capitalism", by Chris Desan (2014)

Making money. Coin, currency and the coming of Capitalism, by Chris Desan, Harvard Law; co-founder, Program on the Study of Capitalism, Oxford University Press

Table of contents here

Abstract:

Money travels the modern world in disguise. It looks like a convention of human exchange - a commodity like gold or a medium like language. But its history reveals that money is a very different matter. It is an institution engineered by political communities to mark and mobilize resources. As societies change the way they create money, they change the market itself - along with the rules that structure it, the politics and ideas that shape it, and the benefits that flow from it.

One particularly dramatic transformation in money's design brought capitalism to England. For centuries, the English government monopolized money's creation. The Crown sold people coin for a fee in exchange for silver and gold. 'Commodity money' was a fragile and difficult medium; the first half of the book considers the kinds of exchange and credit it invited, as well as the politics it engendered. Capitalism arrived when the English reinvented money at the end of the 17th century. When it established the Bank of England, the government shared its monopoly over money creation for the first time with private investors, institutionalizing their self-interest as the pump that would produce the money supply. The second half of the book considers the monetary revolution that brought unprecedented possibilities and problems. The invention of circulating public debt, the breakdown of commodity money, the rise of commercial bank currency, and the coalescence of ideological commitments that came to be identified with the Gold Standard - all contributed to the abundant and unstable medium that is modern money. All flowed as well from a collision between the individual incentives and public claims at the heart of the system. The drama had constitutional dimension: money, as its history reveals, is a mode of governance in a material world. That character undermines claims in economics about money's neutrality. The monetary design innovated in England would later spread, producing the global architecture of modern money.

ARTICLE: "Roman Business Associations", by Andreas M. Fleckner

Roman Business Associations, by Andreas M. Fleckner,  Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law,  forthcoming in Roman Law and Economics, ed. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci.

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Abstract

Roman businessmen could choose between three legal forms for joint business ventures: the societas, the societas publicanorum, and the peculium of a commonly held slave. None of these forms led to larger firms with publicly traded shares. The high level of instability is one of the key explanations: it was difficult under Roman law to commit capital in the long term and finance capital-intensive enterprises. Thesocietas was inevitably liquidated following numerous dissolution events. Members could withdraw their money at any time; their private creditors were not barred from seizing common assets. The peculium was even more unstable: in addition to the dissolution events of the societas, the joint venture came to an end and all peculiumitems reverted back to the masters if the commonly held slave died. The societas publicanorum developed into a more stable institution over time. During the same period, however, its business almost disappeared. Why did Roman law fail to provide organizational forms that allowed businessmen to form large associations and commit capital in the long term? A closer analysis of Roman society suggests that reservations in the social and political setting rather than economic factors or oddities of Roman legal doctrine caused business associations to remain small and unstable. This is an important lesson from history, both for the theory of the firm and for the role that law plays in it.

CONFERENCE: "40.Deutscher Rechtshistorikertag", (Tubinghen, 7-11 September 2014)

WHAT: 40.Deutscher Rechtshistorikertag, Die rechtshistorischen Lehrstühle laden herzlich ein

WHERE: Tubinghen University, Law Department, Tubinghen, Germany

WHEN: 7-11 September 2014

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Programm

Sonntag, 7. September 2014

Ab 13.00	Anmeldung im Kongressbüro, Neue Aula, Geschwister-Scholl-Platz, Erdgeschoss  (ab Montag, 8. September 2014:  Neue Aula, Dozentenzimmer, Raum 138)
13.30	HS 14 Forum Junge Rechtsgeschichte Leitung: David von Mayenburg (Frankfurt/M.)
	Vera Langer (Frankfurt): Der große Vestalinnenprozess von 115/114 v. Chr.  – ein Ereignis im Spannungsverhältnis  zwischen Recht und Religion
	Philipp Klausberger (Wien): Überlegungen zum Verschulden im Römischen  Haftungsrecht
15.30	Matthias Maetschke (Bonn): ‚Von Verdammung der Missethäter zur Bergarbeit‘.  Das Scheitern der Bergwerksstrafe  in der Habsburgermonarchie (1728-1768)
	Lena Foljanty (Frankfurt/M.): Rechtskultur und Methode. Aneignung westlichen Rechtsdenkens im Japan des 19. Jahrhunderts
17.30	Festsaal Eröffnung des Rechtshistorikertags Grußworte Jörg Kinzig (Dekan der Juristischen Fakultät) Heinz-Dieter Assmann (Prorektor der Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen) Rainer Stickelberger (MdL, Justizminister des Landes Baden-Wüttemberg)
18.30	Otfried Höffe (Tübingen): Ist Machiavelli im ‚Il Principe‘ ein Machiavellist?
19.30	Wandelhalle Empfang

ARTICLE: Daniel M. Klerman, "Economic Analysis of Legal History"

(source: Legal History Blog)

Daniel M. Klerman (USC Law School) published "Economic Analysis of Legal History" on SSRN, to be published in a forthcoming work on Methodologies of Law and Economics. 

Abstract:

This essay surveys economic analyses of legal history. In order to make sense of the field and to provide examples that might guide and inspire future research, it identifies and discusses five genres of scholarship.

Law as the dependent variable. This genre tries to explain why societies have the laws they do and why laws change over time. Early economic analysis tended to assume that law was efficient, while later scholars have usually adopted more realistic models of judicial and legislative behavior that take into account interest groups, institutions, and transactions costs.

Law as an independent variable. Studies of this kind look at the effect of law and legal change on human behavior. Examples include analyses of the Glorious Revolution, legal origin, and nineteenth-century women’s rights legislation.

Bidirectional histories. Studies in the first two genres analyze law as either cause or effect. In contrast, bidirectional histories view law and society as interacting in dynamic ways over time. Laws change society, but change in society in turn leads to pressure to change the law, which starts the cycle over again. So, for example, the medieval communal responsibility system fostered international trade by holding traders from the same city or region collectively responsible. Nevertheless, the increase in commerce fostered by the system undermined the effectiveness of collective responsibility and put pressure on cities and nations to develop alternative enforcement institutions.

Private ordering. A significant body of historical work investigates the ability of groups to develop norms and practices partly or wholly independently of the state. Such norms include rules relating whaling, the governance of pirate ships, and, more controversially, medieval commercial law (the “law merchant”).

Litigation and Contracts. Law and economics has developed an impressive body of theories relating to litigation and the structure of contracts. These theories often shed light on legal behavior in former times, including contracts between slave ship owners and captains, and the suit and settlement decisions of medieval private prosecutors.