(image source: Vittorio Klostermann)
Abstract:
The mechanics of the "legal theory of evidence", which dominated German procedural law until the second half of the 19th century, was intended to render the truth of a circumstance to be proven calculable by means of legal rigour and arithmetic consistency. How can we explain in retrospect its seemingly abrupt replacement by the judge´s "free consideration of evidence" according to his subjective conviction as we know it today? Does this indicate something fundamental having changed in the nature and significance of the judge's knowledge of facts? Did a post-Kantian understanding of truth together with an altered conception of social knowledge play a role in this important process in the history of justice? By using the example of civil and criminal jurisdiction, this study examines these questions in its search for "legal truth" – and in doing so outlines a history of the theory of evidence in the 19th century.
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